Japan’s next PM will inherit crucial role in difficult int’l situation: Japan Society’s Walker

Ahead of Japan’s House of Representatives election on Oct. 27, the Mainichi Shimbun asked Japan Society President Joshua Walker what challenges will face the country’s next prime minister amid domestic pressures and a challenging international situation.

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Mainichi Shimbun: “Sasshin,” or a complete remodeling, was the theme of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s presidential election in September. Do you see “sasshin” in new LDP leader and Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s new Cabinet?

Joshua Walker: No. It looks like a continuation. I did not expect Ishiba to become prime minister. He’d run five times. Just like I didn’t expect Trump to become president in 2016 because I didn’t expect him to come through the Republican primary that same way.

I think that what is happening right now is that the LDP is struggling, stuck between the traditional way things are done and a new way. He’s not trying to implement his most progressive agenda. He says it’s more a continuation of the administration of his predecessor Fumio Kishida.

MS: That said, Ishiba is described as an opposition force within the LDP. He has just published a controversial commentary piece for the Washington, D.C.-based Hudson Institute think tank. How would the Japan-watchers in the U.S. see his commentary?

JW: Hudson’s Japan chair reached out to each of the LDP presidential candidates. I think the fact that only Ishiba and Kono answered the institute’s questionnaire is very telling. And what Ishiba said in his answer was radical. In the U.S., we’re not used to hearing a serious LDP candidate voice some of these ideas. There’s been a lot of criticism about Ishiba’s Asian NATO proposal or even his idea of renegotiating the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. But I think the fact that he answered the questionnaire also helped show that Ishiba is a serious person, while many others did not take a chance.

Most U.S.-Japan watchers are paying very close attention, but Washington has not had a big influence here because no one there is fully paying attention. It’s like, “Oh, there’s a new prime minister in Japan,” but there’s also a new prime minister in the U.K., a new NATO secretary-general, and many new leaders coming up. It’s a time for change.

MS: How do you see his idea of an Asian NATO? It is, after all, being rejected by East Asian countries friendly to Tokyo.

JW: As a political scientist, I think you can’t separate history from this. The European story of a unifying continent after World War II is very different from that of Asia. Memories of World War II and the Cold War still resonate deeply there. The Korean peninsula is still divided. Russia still occupies Japanese territory. China is still waging a war against India and Vietnam.

An Asian NATO feels like a good idea for the future; we hope that one day there will be a NATO in Asia, just like there is in Europe. But honestly, even NATO in Europe did not prevent the war in Ukraine. And as an American, I’m worried about America’s role in NATO. If Donald Trump becomes president, he may pull out of NATO. So, is that what Japan wants? We still have to see.

I’m really watching for two things after Japan’s general election. One, how much does the LDP lose? Everybody knows LDP will lose seats, but how much will they be reliant on their alliance partners? Secondly, if Ishiba comes out as the prime minister, will his Cabinet be future-oriented? Because the current one is a caretaker Cabinet. Will Ishiba be able to rely upon his loyalists? Will he be able to unify his party? Right now, his own internal opponents, Sanae Takaichi and Takayuki Kobayashi, have rejected him. Can Ishiba bring them together? Because what the world needs from Japan is stability. If you have a new prime minister every year like we had before (late former Prime Minister Shinzo) Abe, this is going to be challenging for Japan.

MS: Ishiba has another controversial proposal, revising the Status of Forces Agreement governing the legal status of U.S. military forces in Japan. Has this become a source of concern for the Japan-U.S. alliance?

JW: If there was no Donald Trump, I would say yes. But because there is Trump, consider this: If Trump gets elected, he’s going to immediately want to renegotiate and want Japan to pay more. Ishiba would be wise to frame this as an opportunity.

If there’s a Kamala Harris administration, the situation becomes more problematic. I expect a Harris administration would largely continue the policies of President Joe Biden. I don’t think Washington particularly wants to have to revisit something that’s working, and the Status of Forces Agreement has been working for a very long time. The only people for whom it doesn’t work are Okinawans (whose prefecture hosts a high concentration of U.S. bases); that’s the real issue. The mainland has never settled the problem. We don’t know exactly what Ishiba’s view on that is going to be. In some ways, I think the Status of Forces Agreement is less about the U.S. and Japan and more about Tokyo and Okinawa.

MS: What do you think about Kishida’s diplomatic legacy? Increasing the defense budget and revising the three primary security documents were settled during his administration. What does this mean for the United States?

JW: Those are really good questions. If I were Ishiba, I would appreciate Kishida’s diplomatic legacy. He did all the right things, and yet he never became popular at home. Ishiba is known for being a very popular leader, but what will that mean going forward? Again, Kishida’s legacy on the diplomatic stage will be exceptional. The challenge is that, regarding security and economic affairs, much of what Ishiba is inheriting is much more complicated than it was under Kishida. Kishida’s main job was to create stability and continuity from Abe, but Ishiba has to create some distance and change from that. The Japanese people want things to be different. They want a new LDP. Ishiba can’t just stay within the LDP; he has to go to the Japanese population for a mandate on these issues.

MS: National security is not a central point of contention in this election.

JW: I don’t think that any party has really shown anything on this issue. It’s a little bit like the American presidential election–nobody knows what Kamala Harris’s views are on many foreign policy matters. Nothing about Afghanistan, not much on China, and I think it’s the same in the Japanese context. In the LDP leadership election, there were many slogans about strong security. There are many comments from Takaichi and Kobayashi about these things that are very popular on the right. But in the general election … I don’t see very much. That’s a mistake in my mind.

I believe Japan’s future is even more tied to the world than ever, yet Japanese voters are more focused on domestic issues. There’s a disconnect here; for example, Japan is more important to global stability. Yet, Japanese voters aren’t interested in that. That’s why I think that there needs to be a more active debate about foreign policy.

We have two wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, and the most important theater in the entire world, Asia, is Japan’s backyard. This is a particularly unusual time to be living in. If you’re looking at who’s going to be prime minister for the next three years or so, that person will undoubtedly face a question on Taiwan: What is Japan’s role? Does Japan have to always follow the United States? What happens if America becomes more of a pariah state, if you have an American president that is doing unpopular things, like on Israel, climate change, or in trade policies and tariffs and steel. I think that Japan’s prime minister needs to have their own viewpoints on these matters, and certainly, the LDP has a long track record of just those views. Still, we don’t know if the LDP will be the same under Ishiba.

MS: If Trump is reelected, will Japan be able to maintain a relationship with him without Abe?

JW: The Japanese think that Abe was exceptional in this regard and that he had unique character. And I think he was very impressive in many ways. Still, I think with Donald Trump, it’s a very simple playbook of flattery, and being very complimentary towards him is very useful. I think Ishiba can probably manage it. It’s not that complicated.

The challenge with Ishiba is that nobody knows him in the United States. Among all the candidates that ran in the LDP leadership race, we knew most of the foreign ministers (current and former), and we also had a general sense of who Shinjiro Koizumi was because he’s been so popular, and because of his former PM father Junichiro Koizumi.

Out of the nine candidates, seven had American degrees. The only two that didn’t were the two finalists, Ishiba and Takaichi. From an American perspective, this raises the question of whether having all these American degrees really helps because what Japan feels it wants right now is change. And the two candidates that represent change were the two candidates that don’t speak English. So, what does that mean for the future? I don’t know.

MS: Japan will probably have to engage in some very tough negotiations with Trump if he’s elected. If Trump backs off from Ukraine, how should Japan act between the U.S. and European allies?

JW: If I was Japan, I would approach Trump in a very proactive and focused manner. If Trump is elected, I think the Japanese prime minister should first offer to pay more for defense. Because the worst-case scenario is that you can’t come to an agreement and Donald Trump decides to do something extreme, like shift America’s alliances to North Korea or to China or something else, which would be disastrous for Japan.

I think any prime minister of Japan will struggle with this. There’s a big difference between Harris and Trump when it comes to Ukraine. Harris’s views on this are the same as Biden’s: Ukraine must succeed, and there must be a fair solution to the war. Trump, on the other hand, never says there must be a fair solution. He will force Ukraine to give up. He will give Putin power in many ways. I think that will also make Chinese president Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un very happy.

This is all detrimental to Japan. Japan has to become even more closely linked and associated with the other free countries of Asia, and is trying to get India, Australia, and South Korea’s perspectives, to try to keep America in balance in some way.

MS: China launched more military drills near the coast of Taiwan. How do you see the timing of a Taiwan crisis?

JW: The first question the Japanese prime minister has to ask is, “Is America committed to the defense of Taiwan?” If the answer is no, then the question is simple. If China takes the island, Japan has to make do with that. Japan did nothing with Hong Kong. America did nothing with Hong Kong.

The moment the U.S. president takes office in January, the one thing that unifies all Americans is our opposition to China. You’re going to see a very conflictual relationship, no matter who the president is. The one thing that Kamala Harris and Donald Trump can agree on is China is an enemy and that China must be punished in some way for its behavior around the world.

I think Japan needs to be able to play a soft, mediating role. In America, we say, “good cop, bad cop.” America is the bad cop. Japan needs to be the good cop. If Japan begins to act like the bad cop with forceful rhetoric and an antagonistic approach, I think that would make it worse for all us. We need someone to help us save face.

(Interviewed by Kosuke Hatta, New York Bureau)

Profile

Joshua Walker was born in the United States and raised in Hokkaido. After working for the political risk advisory and consulting firm The Eurasia Group, he took up his current post as president of the Japan Society, an organization dedicated to connecting Japanese arts, culture, business, and society with the United States and the world. He holds a PhD in political science.